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Discount volatility is generally an important component of total risk for closed-end 
funds but there is considerable cross-sectional variation in the magnitude of this 
discount volatility.  These are interesting aspects of the closed-end fund discount 
puzzle which have received little attention in the literature, particularly as regards UK 
investment trusts.  This paper seeks to explain the cross-sectional variation in 
discount volatility for the UK investment trust sector.  The sample consists of  59 UK 
conventional  investment  trusts in  continuous  operation  over  the  five  years from  
1 January 1992 to 31 December 1996.  Discount volatility is calculated using monthly 
intervals.  Four explanatory variables are highly significant - trust share turnover, 
standard deviation of NAV return, ln(market value) and percentage of underlying 
assets which are unquoted.  There is no evidence that either small investor sentiment 
















CROSS-SECTIONAL VARIATION IN INVESTMENT  TRUST  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Investment trusts are UK companies whose assets consist of a portfolio of shares or 
other securities.  They enable investors to purchase an interest in a professionally 
managed fund.  Ultimate responsibility for running the affairs of an investment trust 
lies with the board of directors, but day-to-day management is normally delegated to 
professional investment managers.  In common with any other company, an 
investment trust has a fixed capital structure which must contain share capital but 
which may also include loan capital. An advantage of this ‘closed-end’ structure is 
that the fund managers can act in the best long-term interests of their shareholders 
without having to worry about any future need to reduce the underlying portfolio of 
assets.   
 
As the ordinary shares of an investment trust must be listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, the procedure for dealing in the shares is the same as for other listed 
shares.  So investors wishing  to purchase or sell investment trust shares do so at 
prices which reflect the supply and demand for the shares rather than the underlying 
net assets of the company.  Nevertheless, investors generally regard conventional1 
investment trust shares as essentially claims on assets, and investment trust analysts 
watch the relationship between the investment trust share price and the underlying net 
asset value per share (NAV) very carefully. 
 
Discount to NAV is defined as NAV less share price, expressed as a percentage of 
NAV.  Investment trust discounts/premiums are of particular interest to academics as 
they provide an almost unique opportunity to compare the stock market valuation of a 
company with the value of that company’s net assets.  Investment trusts generally 
trade at a discount but providing a satisfactory explanation for this ‘anomaly’ has 
presented something of a puzzle to researchers. 
 
                                                          
1 Conventional  investment trusts are those without a split capital structure. 
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The equivalent of investment trusts in the US are known as US closed-end funds.  As 
with UK investment trusts, they generally trade at a discount and therefore pose a 
similar discount puzzle.    But there are important differences in their ownership 
structure compared with UK investment trusts, which are relevant to this paper.  
Typically, individuals hold a much higher percentage of the equity of US closed-end 
funds compared with UK investment trusts and there is much less variation in the 
importance of individual shareholders across the sector as compared with the UK 
investment trust sector. 
 
There is a vast literature seeking to explain  the closed-end fund discount puzzle.     
The literature mainly concerns US closed-end funds, but some work has been directed 
specifically at UK investment trusts.  Explanations consistent with market efficiency 
that have been proposed include agency costs and miscalculation of  NAV.   The 
agency cost theory says that discounts are a consequence of capitalising future 
management fees or inferior future investment performance.   However, for US 
closed-end funds, Malkiel (1977) finds no correlation between discounts and 
management fees, and Malkiel (1977), Lee et al  (1991) and Pontiff (1995) find no 
significant relationship between discounts and future NAV performance.  
Miscalculation of  NAV covers a number of theories, the most relevant from the 
perspective of  UK investment trusts being the block discount hypothesis.  This states 
that the current market valuation of underlying assets is calculated using  the trading 
price of a marginal share whereas the proceeds from a liquidation, typically involving 
the sale of  large blocks of shares, would be much lower.   Unfortunately, 
miscalculation of NAV arguments are not consistent with the evidence that large 
positive abnormal returns are observed when funds are open-ended (Brauer (1984) 
and Brickley and Schallheim (1985) for the US, and Draper (1989) for the UK).  
 
With the apparent inability to explain the closed-end discount puzzle within the 
framework of the efficient market hypothesis, recent attempts at explaining the 
phenomenon have adopted alternative theories that involve investor irrationality.  The 
investor sentiment theory proposed by Lee et al (1991), which they developed from 
the De Long et al (1990) noise trader model, has been especially popular.  Lee et al 
argue that US discount movements are driven by changes in the sentiment of small 
 5
investors who are the dominant owners of US closed-end funds.  Institutional 
investors fail to offset fully the irrational whims of small investors because the risk of 
discounts widening is cross-sectionally correlated (i.e. systematic) and abitrageurs 
have finite time horizons.   The discount on closed-end funds is therefore interpreted 
as an individual investor sentiment index.  The theory requires that discounts vary 
stochastically because it is precisely this discount fluctuation that is responsible for 
the underpricing of closed-end funds relative to their underlying net assets. 
 
If there is a cost to arbitrage, the difficulty to hedge determines the arbitrage 
profitability and the magnitude of discount anomalies.  Discount volatility for funds 
with foreign assets, however, may partly reflect factors that preclude costless cross-
border transactions: official and unofficial barriers to capital movements, transaction 
costs, time to complete transactions and time mismatch in trading hours. 
 
Discount fluctuations  are important in the context of investment trust risk analysis.  
As discounts vary over time, part of the return from a conventional investment trust 
share is due to changes in the discount.  Thus, discount variation over time contributes 
to the variance of returns from investment trust shares.  
 
Let   Pt  =  share price of investment trust at time t 
        At  =  fully diluted2 net asset value per share at time t 





 (= 1-discount) which we call ‘the ratio’. 
      Rt
p   =  share price total return in period t 
      Rt
A   =  net asset value total return in period t 
 
Then the return on the investment trust shares due to changes in the discount, that is 
the return on ‘the ratio’, 
                   = lo ge ( Pt / Pt−1 ) - log e ( At  / At−1 ) 
                   = ( )log loge t e tr r− −1                                                          
                                                          
2 Some trusts have warrants in issue.  If so, it is normal practice in the investment trust industry to 
make adjustments to NAV on a per share basis by treating warrants as exercised if dilution of  NAV 
 6
 
Share price total return is equal to net asset value total return plus the return on ‘the 
ratio’.  Hence: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )log log log loge tp e tA e t e tR R r r1 1 1+ = + + − −  
The time intervals for the above returns could be of any length - one week, one month 
or even a year. 
 
The standard statistical formula for the variance of the sum of two random variables 
then gives: 
 
( ){ } ( ){ } { }
( ) ( ){ }
   
                                                     (3)
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Thus, the variance of share price total return has been split into the following three 
components. 
a) Variance of net asset value total return. 
b) Variance of the return on ‘the ratio’. 
c) Covariance between net asset value total returns and returns on ‘the ratio’. 
 
We define discount volatility to be the standard deviation of monthly  return on ‘the 
ratio’, that is the square root of the second of the above components of total risk.  The 
literature emphasises the importance of discount volatility as a component of total risk 
and just why discounts are so volatile forms another  part of the discount  puzzle. 
 
This paper concentrates on discount volatility.  More precisely, it aims to explain the 
cross-sectional variation in UK investment trust discount volatility.  Any success in 
understanding discount volatility cross-sectionally may, of course, help in the quest to 
discover why closed-end fund discounts fluctuate so widely over time.  We first 
review the literature relating to discount volatility and identify possible trust attributes 
that may influence discount volatility.  We then carry out regressions to explain the 
cross-sectional variation in discount volatility and draw conclusions from the results. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
would occur, to give  a ‘fully diluted’ figure.   Discounts are then calculated by relating share price to 




2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many recent studies have emphasised the importance of discount volatility as a 
component of total risk.  Research relating to factors influencing discount volatility 
has concentrated on investor behaviour and can be divided into two categories: the 
investor sentiment hypothesis and the role of discount arbitrage traders.   Most of the 
work relates to US closed-end funds.  
 
The importance of discount volatility 
Pontiff (1997), using monthly data from July 1965 to December 1985 on 52 US 
domestic-equity closed-end funds, calculates the figures in Table 1.  The notation is as 
in the introduction above.  R R  is the return on ‘the ratio’. 
 
 Table 1 
Monthly data  1965 - 1985 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Var R P( )  Var R A( )  Var R R( )  2Cov R RA R( , )
 
Average 51.15 37.89 37.33 -25.42 
Median 37.52 24.72 19.62 -7.74 
 
He then computes, for each fund in the sample, the natural log of the ratio of the share 
return variance to the NAV return variance. The average ratio is 0.494 which implies 
that the variance of the average fund’s monthly return  is 64% greater than the 
variance of its underlying NAV return. This excess volatility is largely idiosyncratic 
and unrelated to aggregate market  risk. 
 
Bodurtha et al (1995) look at weekly data for 33 country funds trading on US 
exchanges during the 261-week period covering 1986 to 1990.  They report that 
country fund premiums (and share prices) tend to be more volatile than domestic 
equity fund premiums (and share prices). There is a negative covariance between 
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changes in country fund premiums and their NAV returns but the weekly standard 
deviation of  fund share price changes is still more than twice that of  NAV changes. 
 
Investor sentiment 
Investor sentiment has long been seen as a possible source of discount variation over 
time.  Zweig (1973), for example, examined the differential effect on US closed-end 
fund shares and their underlying net assets of trading by ‘professionals’ and ‘non-
professionals’.  Lee et al (1991) present empirical evidence based on monthly data for 
68 US domestic equity funds over the period July 1965 to December 1985, suggesting 
that discounts are a proxy for changes in individual investor sentiment and that the 
same sentiment affects the returns of small capitalization stocks and other stocks held 
and traded by individual investors.    Their theory is compelling because other 
explanations seem incapable of explaining the closed-end discount puzzle, and there 
has been considerable argument in recent years about the validity of  the theory (see, 
for example, Chen et al (1993) and Chopra et al (1993)). 
 
Hardouvelis et al (1993), Suh (1993), Demirgures (1993)  and Bodurtha  et al (1995) 
use US country fund data to test for investor sentiment.  The study of country funds is 
particularly useful for detecting movements in sentiment because fund prices are 
determined in the local equity market whereas underlying net asset values are 
determined in foreign equity markets.  Country funds therefore capture the differences 
between local sentiment and foreign sentiment, unlike Lee et al (1991) who simply 
measure the differential sentiment between small US investors and those influencing 
the broader US market. All three papers report a persistent common component in the 
fluctuations of different country fund discounts, despite exchange rate volatility and 
the varying degree of investment restrictions imposed by countries.  They suggest that 
this is because  fund share prices reflect time-varying sentiments of US investors 
while their NAVs do not. 
 
Ability to discount arbitrage 
Hoskins (1994) concentrates on the analogy between US closed-end fund discount 
volatility and basis volatility in derivative securities, in that they are both a spread 
between two highly correlated prices.  Basis volatility in derivatives markets is most 
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prevalent when cash-market hedges are difficult to transact, so Hoskins examines all 
the factors that affect the ability of discount arbitrage traders to perform their services 
of adding liquidity to the market for closed-end fund shares.  He carries out a cross-
sectional multiple regression analysis with discount volatility based on weekly 
intervals as the dependent variable.  The two most significant explanatory  variables 
are NAV volatility and turnover (number of shares traded as a proportion of shares 
outstanding) of the fund shares themselves.  The former makes it more difficult to 
hedge the exposure to NAV. The latter is  by far the most significant explanatory 
variable,  suggesting that when turnover is high, liquidity is insufficient to keep 
discounts stable.  Thus, low liquidity for fund shares is the primary contributor to 
discount volatility.  
 
Pontiff (1996), using monthly data from July 1965 to December 1985 on 52 US 
domestic equity closed-end funds, as in  Pontiff (1997), shows that fund share price is 
more likely to deviate from NAV for funds (a) with portfolios that are difficult to 
replicate, (b) that pay out smaller dividends, and (c) with lower market values.  
Although this work is concerned with  the magnitude of discounts or premiums,  it 
may also be relevant to discount volatility. 
 
 
3.  TRUST ATTRIBUTES THAT MAY INFLUENCE DISCOUNT VOLATILITY 
In this section we discuss the choice of trust attributes to be used as explanatory 
variables in  the cross-sectional analysis.  Trust share turnover and standard deviation 
of NAV return are by far the most important attributes for explaining discount 
volatility in Hoskins’ study of US closed-end funds and are therefore included in our 
study.  Other attributes in the Hoskins study are not significant, even at the 5% level. 
Nevertheless, two of the remaining six variables chosen in our study, Ln(market 
value) and Ln(unadjusted share price), have close equivalents in the Hoskins study.  
Two of the variables in our study, percentage of shares held by individuals and 
percentage of underlying assets in the UK, are included to assess whether investor 
sentiment has any impact on discount volatility.  Precise definitions of the eight trust 




Trust share turnover 
Trust share turnover (number of shares traded divided by number of shares 
outstanding), sometimes known as trading velocity, may be regarded as the driving 
force for share price movements but the extent to which this is translated into discount 
movements depends on the ability of  discount anomaly traders to carry out their 
activities. Hoskins finds share turnover to be a very significant positive influence on 
US closed-end fund weekly discount volatility, contrary to what he expected,  but his 
explanation for the result relies on the fact that closed-end funds with high share 
turnover tended to stand on large premiums.3  This is not the case with the 59 UK 
investment trusts which form the sample to be analysed in this chapter.  Of the ten 
trusts with the highest share turnover, only one reached a premium of more than 12% 
during the five year period of observation, with the other nine trusts each trading at a 
discount on average over the period.   
 
Standard deviation of NAV  return 
Taking advantage of discount anomalies without exposure to movements in the 
underlying market(s) is difficult if the underlying net assets are volatile because this 
makes hedging the underlying net assets more difficult.  But having a good hedge is 
all the more important in this situation because a poor hedge will translate into larger 
gains or losses.  So volatile underlying net assets makes hedging difficult but also  
losses (or gains) from not hedging properly tend to be large. 
 
Another possible reason for the influence of  standard deviation of NAV return on 
discount volatility could be staleness of the trust share prices themselves. Such 
staleness would imply sluggish share price response to NAV movements, so the more 
volatile the NAV return the greater the discount volatility.  But as discount volatility 
is calculated monthly in our study rather than, say, weekly, as is common in US 
studies, this is likely to be of minor importance.    
 
                                                          
3 Hoskins argues that shares could no longer be borrowed for shorting once the funds stand on large 
premiums and the normal activity of traders adding liquidity to the market would be shut down. This 
would greatly reduce the liquidity for fund shares, and high trading volume could then create very 
large discount volatility.  
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Standard deviation of  NAV return will depend partly on the trust’s area of 
specialisation, as defined by the five FT-SE Actuaries investment trust sub-sectors - 
International, UK, Geographical, Europe and Venture Capital.  International trusts 
should have relatively low standard deviation of  NAV return.  Correlations between 
the returns from shares held in the ‘world’ market are generally less than those 
between the returns from shares confined to a particular domestic equity market such 
as that of the UK, even when foreign-exchange risk is fully borne by the fund4 (see, 
for example, Solnik (1996)).  So international diversification reduces the standard 
deviation of  NAV return.  Geographical specialists will tend to have high standard 
deviation of NAV return because they are not diversified to the same extent, their 
underlying markets are often volatile (e.g. emerging markets) and currency 
movements increase NAV volatility.  Venture capital trusts, which have a high 
proportion of  unquoted assets, will tend to have low standard deviation of  NAV 
return  because  valuations of the unquoted assets  have varying degrees of staleness 
which  tends to smooth NAV returns. 
 
It is possible that trusts with volatile underlying net assets will attract trading activity5 
so standard deviation of  NAV return may be positively correlated with our first 




Gearing will influence discount volatility indirectly through its influence on the 
standard deviation of  NAV return.  But gearing  also directly affects discount 
volatility because it reduces the denominator (NAV) in the discount to NAV  
calculation.  This can be seen as follows: 
 
Discount to NAV  =  (NAV - Value of equity)/NAV 
        =  (Value of assets - Value of debt - Value of equity)/NAV  
 
Therefore,  
                                                          
4 However, currency exposure can be managed independently of the underlying portfolio and this may 
be carried out with the aim of boosting returns. 
5  This trading activity may be based on the fundamentals rather than discount anomaly trading. 
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Discount to NAV  =  (Value of assets - Total value of the firm)/NAV                  (1) 
 
If we hold the value of the underlying assets constant and we assume that the level of 
gearing has no influence on the total market value of the individual firm, in line with 
the Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller (1977) proposition, it follows that the 
numerator of the right hand side of  Equation (1) will not depend on the level of 
gearing.  But the denominator (NAV) will be lower for higher levels of gearing.   
Thus, movements in the difference between the value of the underlying assets and the 
total market value of the firm (the discount) will be exaggerated with higher levels of 
gearing because discount to NAV is expressed as a proportion of NAV rather than as 
a proportion of total market value.  It follows that gearing tends to increase discount 
volatility. 
 
Ln (market value) 
Low marketability of  the trust shares makes discount anomaly trading less profitable. 
If a discount anomaly opportunity exists,  there is only a small potential profit because 
a relatively small order will correct the pricing anomaly.   Thus, the lower the 
marketability of the trust shares, the greater the discount trading range, and hence the 
higher the discount volatility. 
 
Market value of a trust is often taken as a rough  proxy for marketability (see, for 
example, the London Business School Risk Measurement Service).  We take the 
logarithm of the market value so that the same percentage difference cross-sectionally 
in market value at different levels of market value has the same effect in the analysis. 
 
Ln (unadjusted share price) 
There may be a tendency for lower share prices to be associated with larger bid-offer 
spreads (as a percentage of share price), which directly increases dealing costs 
associated with discount anomaly trading.  This implies that  trusts with lower share 
prices will tend to have higher discount volatility.  The share price to be used as an 
explanatory variable must be “unadjusted”, that is not adjusted for subsequent capital 
changes.  We also take logarithms so that the same percentage difference cross-
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sectionally in share price at different levels of share price has the same effect in the 
analysis.   
 
Unadjusted share price may be positively correlated with market value.  The market 
value of a trust will reflect its share price history although this ignores capital changes 
such as scrip issues which may have occurred. 
 
Percentage of underlying assets which are unquoted 
Directors’ valuations of unquoted investments6 may be historic to some extent, only 
changing when ‘something happens’, such as a share stake changing hands.  This is 
particularly relevant to venture capital trusts which invest mainly in smaller unquoted 
companies.  If  NAVs are stale, this has a direct effect on discount volatility as it 
reduces the correlation between share price returns and NAV returns.  We therefore 
include percentage of underlying assets which are unquoted as an explanatory 
variable. 
 
It has already been noted that the valuations of unquoted assets  have varying degrees 
of staleness which  tends to smooth NAV returns, so there may be negative 
correlation between the percentage of underlying assets which are unquoted and the 
standard deviation of NAV return, a trust attribute which has already been identified 
as a possible explanatory variable. 
 
Percentage of shares held by individuals 
According to the investor sentiment theory, small investors are assumed to deal on 
‘noise’  rather than on the fundamentals.  Rational arbitrageurs fail to offset fully the 
discount anomalies created by the irrational whims of small investors because such 
arbitrageurs have finite time  horizons implying that their activities are risky and 
therefore limited.  As there is considerable variation in the importance of individual 
shareholders across the UK investment trust sector, it is easy to test whether discount 
volatility is related to the proportion of shares held by individuals. 
 
Percentage of underlying assets in the UK 
                                                          
6 British Venture Capital Association guidelines are followed by most trusts. 
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There is a different type of investor sentiment that may be relevant to discount 
volatility, namely ‘UK market investor sentiment’.  Investment trust shares are traded 
in the UK and may therefore be subject to investor sentiment that is specific to the 
UK.  This UK specific sentiment may increase discount volatility if the underlying 
assets are held overseas but if the underlying assets are held in the UK,  there will be a 
















TABLE  2 
 
Definitions of Trust Attributes Chosen as Explanatory Variables 
 
Trust share  Average over months 1/92 to 12/96 of (no of shares traded in 
turnover  month divided by average no of shares outstanding in that    
   month) 
 
 
Standard deviation  Standard deviation of monthly undiluted NAV return over the 
of NAV return  months 1/92 to 12/96 
 
 
Gearing  1/2*(actual gearing at 31/12/91 + actual gearing at 31/12/96)  
   where actual gearing is the ratio of total assets (less fixed  
   interest and cash assets) to shareholders’ funds 
 
 
Ln(market value) Natural logarithm of the average over months 12/91 to 12/96 of
   the month-end market value of  the trust 
 
 
Ln(unadjusted price) Natural logarithm of the average over the months 12/91 to  
   12/96 of  the month-end share price (unadjusted for subsequent 
   capital changes) 
 
 
% of underlying  1/2*(% assets unquoted at 31/12/91 + % assets unquoted at 31/12/96) 




% of shares held by  Percentage of the share capital of  the investment trust held by 
individuals  individual investors (1994, where possible) 
 
 
% of underlying 1/2*(% of assets in UK on 31/12/91 + % of assets in UK on 31/12/96) 






4.   DATA 
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The sample consists of the 59 UK conventional investment trusts in continuous 
operation over the five years from 1 January 1992 to 31 December 1996 for which 
share trading volume data are available on Datastream.7  These tend to be the largest 
trusts in the sector. Trusts in the sample are listed in the Appendix.   
 
Table 3 gives data sources for all variables in the analysis. 
 
Table 4 shows the actual values for the dependent variable, discount volatility, and for 
all the explanatory variables.  A number of relevant points can be made from the 
study of  Table 4: 
a)  The average value for discount volatility (Column 3) is 3.25% which compares 
with an average value for standard deviation of NAV return (Column 5) of  4.40%.  
So discount volatility is an important component of total risk.   
b) Discount volatility varies widely across the sample, ranging from 7.22% for 
Dartmoor Investment Trust to 1.60% for Kleinwort Overseas Investment Trust.  
(Column 3). 
c)  International trusts tend to have relatively low standard deviation of NAV return, 
geographical specialists tend to have relatively high standard deviation of NAV 
return,  and the two venture capital trusts have low standard deviation of NAV return.  
(Column 5).  This is consistent with points made earlier. 
d)   There is little variation in the level of gearing across the sector.   Only one trust in 
the sample, Dartmoor Investment Trust, has a high level of gearing. (Column 6). (This 
trust also has  the highest standard deviation of NAV return and the highest discount 
volatility.) 
                                                          





Data Sources for  Variables in the Cross-sectional Regression Analysis 
 
Discount volatility                  Datastream 
Trust share   Datastream 
turnover       Bloomberg  
 
Standard deviation   Datastream 
of NAV return   
 
Gearing   NatWest Securities, Daily NAV Service, Year-end 1996 
    County NatWest WoodMac, Daily NAV Service, Year- end 1991 
 
 
Ln(market value)  Datastream 
 
 
Ln(unadjusted price)  Datastream 
 
 
% of underlying   NatWest Securities, Daily NAV Service, Year-end 1996 
assets which are   County NatWest WoodMac, Daily NAV Service, Year-end 1991 
unquoted 
     
 
 
% of shares held by   NatWest Securities, Investment Trust Annual, 1994-95 
individuals8   AITC Investment Trust Directory, Summer 1994 
    AITC Investment Trust Index, 1992  
    NatWest Securities, Shareholders Over 3%, April 1997  
 
 
% of underlying  NatWest Securities, Daily NAV Service, Year-end 1996 





                                                          
8 There was some difficulty in obtaining the percentage of shares held by individuals for some trusts.  
In three cases, Abtrust New Dawn, Templeton Emerging Markets and Foreign & Colonial German, an 
estimate had to be made on the basis of  the little information that was available on shareholdings. 
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TABLE 4 
  (1)       (2)           (3)          (4)           (5)            (6)          (7)           (8)            (9)         (10)       (11)  
trust sector discvol turnover stdevnavr gearing ln(MV) ln(UPrice) %U/Q %individs %UK 
aot internatnl 0.0164 0.0277 0.0357 105 6.1216 5.9887 3.5 9.2 41 
bnkr internatnl 0.0245 0.0372 0.0390 101.5 5.6207 5.1825 0.5 30.28 47.5 
bti internatnl 0.0205 0.0108 0.0363 101 5.0894 5.7579 3.5 16.1 54.5 
bset internatnl 0.0236 0.0318 0.0362 131 5.8280 4.5494 1 39.2 72.5 
btem internatnl 0.0205 0.0252 0.0366 99.5 4.8211 4.4183 7 4.68 57.5 
edin internatnl 0.0185 0.0231 0.0367 110 6.7498 5.6818 2 49.6 77 
ensc internatnl 0.0281 0.0201 0.0384 102 5.2075 4.7350 4.5 16.5 48.5 
fcs internatnl 0.0315 0.0357 0.0371 106 5.0260 5.0306 7.5 34.8 49 
frcl internatnl 0.0194 0.0391 0.0375 108 7.2081 5.1820 4 45.9 39.5 
mnks internatnl 0.0173 0.0208 0.0397 95.5 5.9503 6.2040 0.5 18.1 37.5 
myi internatnl 0.0255 0.0290 0.0379 101.5 5.9685 5.8039 24 53.1 48 
rcp internatnl 0.0438 0.0255 0.0261 105.5 5.7005 5.1114 29.5 16.56 24.5 
scam internatnl 0.0181 0.0266 0.0291 111.5 5.8277 5.0230 5.5 46.1 64 
scea internatnl 0.0211 0.0215 0.0377 113.5 6.2356 4.3894 7.5 18.2 52.5 
scin internatnl 0.0167 0.0273 0.0362 102 6.3774 5.3952 4.5 36.2 47.5 
smt internatnl 0.0203 0.0240 0.0397 106.5 6.6654 5.3825 0.5 23.3 51.5 
sts internatnl 0.0218 0.0221 0.0382 112.5 5.6021 4.4379 1 62.1 69 
tru internatnl 0.0324 0.0296 0.0401 107 5.7875 5.2098 5 12.44 64 
wtan internatnl 0.0154 0.0326 0.0372 102 6.6989 5.3928 2.5 12.5 60 
dit uk 0.0722 0.0627 0.0781 194.5 3.6389 4.7539 0.5 52.9 100.5 
fmn uk 0.0249 0.0330 0.0345 101 5.9980 5.6299 15 15.1 80.5 
gvs uk 0.0232 0.0439 0.0486 104.5 5.5398 5.5584 1 8.4 88 
iei uk 0.0705 0.0577 0.0609 129.5 3.8784 4.5639 15.5 19.1 91.5 
mrch uk 0.0232 0.0298 0.0427 105.5 5.5605 5.5376 1 39.5 91.5 
mgs uk 0.0416 0.0328 0.0413 87.5 4.5238 4.7844 1 12 96.5 
mge uk 0.0326 0.0380 0.0402 98 3.7150 4.8781 0 91.9 98 
mut uk 0.0212 0.0239 0.0359 95 5.6162 5.7913 10.5 61.2 84.5 
smc uk 0.0398 0.0775 0.0436 98.5 3.8471 4.7588 0 20 100 
tmpl uk 0.0247 0.0300 0.0382 97.5 5.2479 5.8043 4.5 42.2 95 
thrg uk 0.0489 0.0426 0.0464 126.5 5.3583 4.2610 19 23.5 98.5 
trcd uk 0.0218 0.0278 0.0398 109 5.6764 4.9835 0 60.5 100 
try uk 0.0608 0.0515 0.0364 116.5 4.7008 3.3660 22.5 12.4 84.5 
vin uk 0.0333 0.0211 0.0311 133.5 3.8101 4.6705 37.5 18.1 99 
abd geograph 0.0383 0.0581 0.0617 95.5 4.2508 5.2380 0 31.8 4 
amts geograph 0.0343 0.0500 0.0377 95.5 5.3580 5.5500 3.5 24.2 6.5 
efm geograph 0.0338 0.0311 0.0746 104.5 5.2881 4.2338 0.5 12 1.5 
fam geograph 0.0319 0.0530 0.0422 99 5.2807 5.6372 6.5 15.3 3 
fem geograph 0.0407 0.0254 0.0618 86.5 4.8158 4.9442 1 17.8 10.5 
ffe geograph 0.0284 0.0307 0.0654 118 6.1202 5.7068 2 12.8 0 
flmj geograph 0.0360 0.0677 0.0680 111 5.8286 5.3792 3 12.1 2 
fov geograph 0.0189 0.0293 0.0368 97.5 5.9143 5.6303 4.5 14.6 4.5 
fct geograph 0.0590 0.0607 0.0617 107.5 4.8698 4.5463 15.5 0.6 10 
fcp geograph 0.0307 0.0640 0.0497 99 5.7875 5.4642 1.5 34.5 1 
gtja geograph 0.0516 0.0535 0.0551 97.5 4.9062 5.3779 2 12 1 
gtm geograph 0.0439 0.0712 0.0720 108.5 4.2635 4.7038 0 12 0.5 
gor geograph 0.0281 0.0588 0.0561 120 6.3301 5.6746 4.5 14.3 1 
kos geograph 0.0160 0.0319 0.0379 103 5.2061 5.4264 7 18.7 14 
msm geograph 0.0259 0.0279 0.0517 109 5.3859 5.9708 7 51.9 14 
oit geograph 0.0246 0.0286 0.0378 97 4.8111 5.7826 0.5 15.7 0.5 
tem geograph 0.0456 0.0570 0.0595 89.5 5.8655 5.4133 0 34.7 9 
trv geograph 0.0441 0.0612 0.0705 102.5 4.8468 4.7808 4 31.2 1 
fev europe 0.0340 0.0440 0.0346 90.5 4.3336 5.0438 0.5 11 25 
fut europe 0.0312 0.0389 0.0404 101 5.3014 5.7279 9.5 18.4 5 
fef europe 0.0431 0.0503 0.0376 106.5 3.7712 4.5068 1.5 15.8 0 
fcg europe 0.0390 0.0597 0.0390 91.5 3.8254 4.7592 0 19.2 0.5 
fcu europe 0.0279 0.0400 0.0392 108 4.9186 5.4202 1 70.51 4 
klc europe 0.0256 0.0237 0.0364 109.5 5.1377 5.3483 17 11.6 55 
elta vencap 0.0579 0.0339 0.0263 103.5 6.2405 5.7011 64.5 8 62.5 
fcet vencap 0.0532 0.0153 0.0321 98 4.1718 4.2332 65.5 6.8 74 
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5.  REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
We now carry out regressions to explain the cross-sectional variation in  discount 
volatility.  Table 5 shows cross correlations for the explanatory variables.  It confirms 
a number of  points made earlier.  There is  high positive correlation between turnover 
and standard deviation of  NAV return, and also between ln(market value) and 
ln(unadjusted price).   Standard deviation of  NAV return is positively correlated with 




Cross correlations of Explanatory Variables 
 
        turnover   stdevnavr   gearing    ln(mv)     ln(uprice)     %u/q     %individs    %UK 
 
turnover        
 
stdevnavr      0.58 
 
gearing          0.14            0.30 
 
ln(mv)          -0.36          -0.23         -0.13  
 
ln(uprice)     -0.18           -0.13        -0.27       0.47  
 
% u/q           -0.23           -0.34          0.07      -0.05        -0.17         
 
% individs    -0.10           -0.07          0.16       0.04          0.11         -0.24 
 
% UK          -0.30      -0.34         0.33      -0.07         -0.24           0.23        0.27 
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Table 6 shows the expected signs for correlations between discount volatility and 




Expected Signs for Correlations between  Explanatory Variables and Discount 
Volatility 
 
Explanatory variable       Expected sign     Reasoning 
 
 
Trust share turnover  Positive Trust share turnover is the central 
driving       force for share price movements
  
 
St dev of NAV return  Positive  Standard deviation of NAV return  
      proxies for both the ability and the need 
      to hedge underlying net assets from the 
      discount anomaly trader’s viewpoint 
         
Gearing   Positive Gearing exaggerates discount movements 
      because the discount is expressed as a 
      percentage of NAV 
 
Ln (market value)  Negative The higher the market value the more 
      marketable the trust shares and the  
      narrower the discount trading range 
 
Ln(unadjusted price)  Negative Lower priced shares tend to have larger 
      bid-offer spreads which increases dealing 
      costs associated with discount anomaly 
      trading 
 
Percentage unquoted  Positive Valuations of unquoted assets tend to be 
      historic which reduces the correlation 
      between share price returns and NAV 
      returns  
 
Percentage individuals  Positive           According to the investor sentiment  
                theory, discount movements are driven by 
      changes in the sentiment of small  
      investors 
 
Percentage UK  Negative The more underlying assets held in  
      the UK, the less impact UK specific  
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      sentiment will have on discount volatility  
      as there is a cancelling out effect 
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Table 7 shows the correlation coefficients between discount volatility and each of the 
explanatory variables.  The signs are as expected for the first six explanatory variables 
but are opposite to that expected for the last two explanatory variables,  namely 
percentage of shares held by individuals and percentage of underlying assets in the 
UK.  The magnitude of the correlation coefficients between discount volatility and 
these last two explanatory variables are, however, fairly low. 
 
TABLE 7 
Correlations between Explanatory Variables and Discount Volatility 
 
Explanatory variables         Correlation with discount volatility 
Trust share turnover                0.55 
St dev NAV return       0.44     
Gearing      0.35  
Ln (market value)        -0.58 
Ln(unadjusted price)    -0.50  
Percentage unquoted     0.38 
Percentage individuals   -0.21 
Percentage UK     0.03 
 
 
Table 8 shows the results of the multiple regression of discount volatility on the eight 
explanatory variables.  The signs for the regression coefficients are the same as the 
corresponding correlation coefficients in Table 7.  The t-statistics, however,  indicate 
that some of the explanatory variables are far more significant than others.  Trust 
share turnover, standard deviation of NAV return, ln(market value) and percentage of 
underlying assets which are unquoted all have t-statistics which are significant at the 
0.5% level (two-tail test).   Ln(unadjusted price) has a t-statistic of -1.80 but Table 5 
shows that this variable is highly correlated with ln(market value), with a correlation 
coefficient  of  0.47, indicating possible multicollinearity in the multiple regression.    
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TABLE 8 
Regression(1) of Discount Volatility on Explanatory Variables 
 
Trust attribute                  Coefficient         t-statistic 
Constant   0.03362 2.51   
Trust share turnover  0.32392 4.32*  
St dev NAV return  0.33962 3.31*  
Gearing   0.00007 0.99 
Ln (market value)           -0.00421          -3.32* 
Ln(unadjusted price)           -0.00349          -1.80 
Percentage unquoted  0.00052 6.61* 
Percentage individuals           -0.00003 -0.47  
Percentage UK  0.00002  0.64 
 * significant at the 0.5% level (two-tail test) 
  R-square = 0.79 
 
Gearing, percentage of shares held by individuals and percentage of underlying assets 
in the UK have t-statistics of 0.99, -0.47 and 0.64 respectively.   It is no surprise that 
the t-statistic for gearing is not significant; we have already noted that there is little 
variation in the level of gearing accross the sample.  What is perhaps surprising is that 
the t-statistics for the other two variables, which both relate to investor sentiment, are 
not significant. 
 
Table 9 shows the results of a regression of discount volatility on the four most 
significant explanatory variables only, with the other four original explanatory 
variables excluded. The R-square is 0.76 and the constant together with the four 
explanatory variables each have t-statistics which are significant at the 0.5% level.  It 
should be remembered from Table 5, however, that there is a correlation coefficient  
of  0.58 between turnover and standard deviation of  NAV return, so the coefficients 





Regression(2) of Discount Volatility on Explanatory Variables 
 
Trust attribute                   Coefficient       t-statistic 
Constant   0.02817 3.35*   
Trust share turnover  0.31570 4.15*  
St dev NAV return  0.37583 3.99* 
ln (market value)           -0.00543          -4.61* 
Percentage unquoted  0.00058           7.72* 
 * significant at the 0.5% level (two-tail test) 
  R-square = 0.76 
 
The t-statistic for percentage of assets which are unquoted is very high at 7.72. It is 
interesting to note therefore that if the two venture capital trusts, Electra and Foreign 
& Colonial Enterprise, which have by far the highest proportion of unquoted assets 
among  trusts within the sample,  are removed from the data set, the t-statistic reduces 
to 4.74.  But this is still significant at the 0.5% level and  the regression coefficient for 
this variable is roughly unchanged at 0.00059 (compared with 0.00058).  Given the 
relatively little variation in the proportion of underlying assets which are unquoted 
across the sector, however,  further investigation is necessary. 
 
To test the stability of the regression coefficients in Table 9, we now split the period 
of observation into two equal sub-periods, 1/92 to 6/94 inclusive and 7/94 to 12/96 
inclusive, and carry out regressions for these two 30 month periods separately.  The 
results are given in Table 10.   Note that all four explanatory variables have t-statistics 
which are significant at the 0.5% level for the regressions in respect of both 30 month 
periods, as was the case for the full five year period.  It is clear, however, that the 
coefficient for “percentage of underlying assets which are unquoted” is unstable, 





                                            Period 1/92 to 6/94                  Period 7/94 to 12/96 
Trust attribute       Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 0.03011 2.51 0.03483 5.38* 
Trust share turnover 0.23121 2.82* 0.22526 3.45* 
St dev NAV return 0.49108 4.04* 0.26383 3.38* 
In(market value) -0.00667 -4.17* -0.00494 -5.21* 
Percentage unquoted  0.00080 7.37* 0.00020 3.42* 
    R-square = 0.72       R-square = 0.64 
 
When all eight explanatory variables are included in the regressions, each of the four 
explanatory variables in Table 10 are significant at the 0.5% level for both 30 month 
periods.  The other four explanatory varibles are not significant at this level, although  
Ln(unadjusted price) is significant at the 1% level in the second period.  In particular, 
“percentage of  shares held by individuals” is not significant in either period (t-
statistics -0.50 and -0.49) and “percentage of underlying assets in the UK” is also not 
significant in either period (t-statistics 0.30 and -0.02).  This confirms the earlier 
observation that both small investor sentiment and UK specific investor sentiment 















6.  PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS 
To assess possible problems in the collinearity of  our explanatory variables, we carry 
out a principal component analysis of the eight original explanatory variables for our 
sample of  59 trusts. Eigenvalues and factor loadings are shown in Table 11 and Table 
12 respectively.   
                       
                                  TABLE 11 
                                 Eigenvalues 
  % total Cumul. Cumul. 
 Eigenval Variance Eigenval % 
1 2.207 27.586 2.207 27.586 
2 1.842   23.028 4.049 50.614 
3 1.365 17.059 5.414 67.673 
4 0.864 10.801 6.278 78.474 
5 0.569 7.115 6.847 85.590 
6 0.435 5.440 7.282 91.029 
7 0.412 5.151 7.694 96.181 
8 0.306 3.819 8.000 100.000
 
                                      
 
                                         TABLE 12 
                                      Factor loadings 
 Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
TURNOVER -0.826 0.147 -0.026 -0.018 -0.244 -0.231 -0.413 -0.107 
STDNAVR -0.825 0.207 0.159 0.269 0.026 0.094 0.116 0.396 
GEARING -0.336 -0.551 0.389 0.583 -0.017 0.013 0.154 -0.260 
LOG_MV_ 0.578 0.431 0.204 0.497 0.228 0.093 -0.359 0.046 
LOG_UP_ 0.422 0.658 0.238 0.187 -0.399 -0.304 0.212 0.017 
%UQ 0.321 -0.502 -0.557 0.274 -0.452 0.169 -0.097 0.129 
%IND 0.131 -0.140 0.832 -0.304 -0.286 0.287 -0.111 0.035 
%UK 0.314 -0.764 0.292 -0.035 0.107 -0.401 -0.095 0.223 
Expl.Var 2.207 1.842 1.365 0.864 0.569 0.435 0.412 0.306 
Prp.Totl 28% 23% 17% 11% 7% 5% 5% 4% 
 28% 51% 68% 78% 86% 91% 96% 100% 
 
The first four factors represent 78% of the total variation,  but there is only a gradual 
reduction in the contribution to total variance from the factors, so multicollinearity 
would not appear to be a problem.  
 
 Factor 1 represents 28% of the total variation.  It is heavily loaded towards turnover 
and standard deviation of NAV return.  Factor 1 scores for all the trusts in our sample 
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are illustated in Figure 1.  Note that the factor 1 scores for all the international trusts 
are positive and for nearly all the geographical trusts they are negative.  This suggests 
that inclusion of  binary variables for ‘international’ and ‘geographical’, indicating 
whether or not trusts are international or geographical specialists, as explanatory 
variables in the regression analysis may help to explain the cross-sectional variation 
in discount volatility.  The results are given in Table 13. 
 
TABLE 13 
Regression(3) of Discount Volatility on Explanatory Variables 
 
Trust attribute Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 0.02111 2.38 
Trust share turnover 0.34753 4.51* 
St dev NAV return 0.49859 4.69* 
Ln (market value) -0.00514 -3.87* 
Percentage unquoted 0.00059 7.78* 
Geographical -0.00521 -1.90 
International 0.00112 0.40 
* significant at the 0.5% level (two-tail test) 
  R-square = 0.78 
 
As ‘international’ is clearly not significant, we now exclude it from the regression, but 
we retain the explanatory variable ‘geographical’.  The results of the regression are 











Regression(4) of Discount Volatility on Explanatory Variables 
 
Trust attribute Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 0.02066 2.36 
Trust share turnover 0.33977 4.59* 
St dev NAV return 0.49785 4.72* 
Ln (market value) -0.00488 -4.21* 
Percentage unquoted 0.00058 8.06* 
Geographical -0.00566 -2.27 
   
* significant at the 0.5% level (two-tail test) 
  R-square = 0.78 
 
The sign of the ‘geographical’ coefficient is negative and is significant at the 2.5% 
level.  This suggests that geographical specialists tend to have lower discount 
volatility than other trusts, other things equal.  Note, however, that this variable is 
correlated with trust share turnover (corr coeff = 0.41) and with standard deviation of 
NAV return (corr coeff = 0.62).   
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
Discount volatility is generally an important component of total risk for closed-end 
funds, but there is considerable cross-sectional variation in the  magnitude of this 
discount volatility.   These are interesting aspects of the closed-end fund discount 
puzzle which have received little attention in the literature, particularly as regards UK 
investment trusts.  
 
In this paper, we try to explain the cross-sectional variation in discount volatility for 
the UK investment trust sector. The sample consists of 59 UK conventional 
investment trusts in continuous operation over the five years from 1 January 1992 to 
31 December 1996. Discount volatility is calculated using monthly intervals. Four 
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explanatory variables are highly significant - trust share turnover, standard deviation 
of NAV return, ln(market value) and percentage of underlying assets which are 
unquoted.   The likely reasons for the significance of these variables are as follows.  
Trust share turnover is the central driving force for share price movements.  
Standard deviation of NAV return proxies for both the ability and the need to hedge 
underlying net assets from the discount anomaly trader’s perspective.  Market value 
proxies for marketability, and the more marketable the trust shares, the narrower the 
discount trading range.  Percentage of underlying assets which are unquoted  is 
significant because valuations of unquoted assets tend to be historic which reduces the 
correlation between share price returns and NAV returns. 
 
There is no evidence that either small investor sentiment or UK specific sentiment has 
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APPENDIX - Sample for Cross-sectional Analysis of Discount Volatility 
 Trust Mnemonic  
   
 Abtrust New Dawn Inv Trust PLC abd  
 American Trust PLC amts  
 Anglo & Overseas Trust PLC aot  
 Bankers Investment Trust PLC bnkr  
 Baring Tribune Investment Trust PLC bti  
 British Assets Trust PLC bset  
 British Empire Sec & General TstPLC btem  
 Dartmoor Investment Trust PLC dit  
 Edinburgh Dragon Trust PLC efm  
 Edinburgh Investment Trust PLC edin  
 Electra Investment Trust PLC elta  
 English & Scottish Investors PLC ensc  
 Fidelity European Values PLC fev  
 Fleming American Inv Trust PLC fam  
 Fleming Continental Euro Inv Tst fut  
 Fleming Emerging Mkts Inv Tst PLC fem  
 Fleming European Fledgling Inv Tst fef  
 Fleming Far Eastern Inv Trust PLC ffe  
 Fleming Japanese Inv Trust PLC flmj  
 Fleming Mercantile Inv Trust PLC fmn  
 Fleming Overseas Inv Trust PLC fov  
 Foreign &Col emergingMktsInvTstPLC fct  
 Foreign & Col Enterprise Tst PLC fcet  
 Foreign & Col Invest Trust PLC frcl  
 Foreign & Col. German Inv Tst PLC fcg  
 Foreign & Col. Pacific Inv Tst PLC fcp  
 Foreign & Colonial Eurotrust PLC fcu  
 Foreign & Colonial Smaller Cos PLC fcs  
 G.T.Japan Investment Trust PLC gtja  
 Gartmore Emerging Pacific Inv Tst gtm  
 Govett Oriental Inv Trust PLC gor  
 Govett Strategic Inv Trust PLC gvs  
 INVESCO English & Intl.Trust PLC iei  
 Kleinwort Charter Inv Trust PLC klc  
 Kleinwort Overseas Inv Trust PLC kos  
 Merchants Trust PLC mrch  
 Monks Investment Trusts PLC mnks  
 Moorgate Smaller Co's Inc Trust PLC mgs  
 Morgan Grenfell Equity Inc Tst PLC mge  
 Murray Income Trust PLC mut  
 Murray International Trust PLC myi  
 Murray Smaller Markets Trust PLC msm  
 Overseas Investment Trust PLC oit  
 RIT Capital Partners PLC rcp  
 Scottish American Investment Co PLC scam  
 Scottish Eastern Inv Trust PLC scea  
 Scottish Investment Trust PLC scin  
 Scottish Mortgage & Trust PLC smt  
 Securities Trust of Scotland PLC sts  
 Smaller Companies Inv Trust PLC smc  
 Temple Bar Investment Trust PLC tmpl  
 Templeton Emerging Markets IT PLC tem  
 Throgmorton Trust PLC thrg  
 TR City of London Trust PLC trcd  
 TR Pacific Investment Trust PLC trv  
 TR Property Investment Trust PLC try  
 TR Smaller Companies Inv Trust PLC tru  
 Value & Income Trust PLC vin  
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